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Articles
CLASH FOR CASH: THE CONFLICT OVER TAX
WHISTLEBLOWER CONTRACTS
JEREMIAH CODER*
THE Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) handling of the revised statutorytax whistleblower program under Internal Revenue Code section
7623 has faced heavy criticism for several years.  Congress, hoping to at-
tract more valuable information on high-dollar tax evasion by sweetening
the potential award payout, revamped the program in 2006 as part of the
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.1  But many whistleblower advo-
cates see the IRS as unwilling to take some actions necessary to make the
program truly effective.
The Service’s refusal to enter into written information-sharing con-
tracts with informers, as provided for under code section 6103(n), has
greatly frustrated tax whistleblower practitioners.  Those agreements allow
the IRS to sidestep traditional prohibitions on disclosure of confidential
tax return information, giving tax whistleblowers access to financial
records and other information that are normally deemed out-of-bounds.
However, the IRS has steadfastly refused to utilize written contracts, poten-
tially dampening the attractiveness of the program and, according to crit-
ics, reducing the nation’s revenue coffers by billions in unpaid taxes.
Understandably, one potential reason for the IRS’s current course is a
fear that giving tax whistleblowers access to sensitive information regard-
ing the individuals and entities who they are submitting claims on will
weaken the tax system by making taxpayers feel less safe about the privacy
of reported tax information.  While improper disclosure is a legitimate
concern, whistleblower advocates contend that the use of section 6103(n)
agreements is unlikely to harm the continued confidentiality of taxpayer
information that supports the tax system.  But other practitioners believe
any extension of the opportunity to delve into sensitive personal records
* The author is a federal tax controversy attorney.
1. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432,
§§ 302–07, 120 Stat. 2922 (2006).
(409)
1
Coder: Clash For Cash: The Conflict Over Tax Whistleblower Contracts
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR301.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-AUG-14 13:59
410 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 409
of another taxpayer puts those individuals and companies at risk of having
information misused without effective deterrents in place.
This Article reviews the sharp disagreement between those who want
the government to start making written contracts under section 6103(n) a
routine part of whistleblower cases versus tax traditionalists who worry that
an expanded whistleblower program will end up further impinging on tax-
payer rights of confidentiality.  Even though the IRS has yet to give in to
whistleblower proponents, the aggressive lobbying makes it seem possible
that administrative practice could change in the future,2 leaving corporate
and high net-worth taxpayers wondering what such a shift means for their
privacy.
I. TAXPAYER PRIVACY
Section 6103 has operated for the past several decades as a type of
high-security firewall guarding against the disclosure of taxpayer informa-
tion and protecting the integrity of the tax system.  The section’s current
statutory iteration is often viewed as a key mechanism for keeping public
compliance with the tax code fairly high.  The seemingly tight limits
placed on when tax return information can be shared helps foster the
self–assessment model upon which the U.S. tax system is based by provid-
ing taxpayers a sense of security that the information they provide to the
IRS is kept confidential.
Although section 6103 quietly existed from 1910 until its major revi-
sion in the 1970s, the predecessor version of the statute actually provided
little protection to taxpayers.  In characterizing taxpayer returns as public
records, the pre-1976 statute allowed the executive branch great license in
deciding with whom to share return information.  Indeed, the alleged
abuse of access to taxpayer information by President Nixon led to the 1976
reforms to section 6103 that made Congress the gatekeeper of tax return
information and established the strict privacy regime that exists today.3
2. The U.S. Senate’s confirmation of John Koskinen as the new IRS Commis-
sioner, on December 20, 2013, brings substantial potential for agency change in
the whistleblower arena.  Although Koskinen has no written record on the tax
whistleblower program, during Koskinen’s nomination process, Senator Charles
Grassley wrote asking him to help the IRS change its tune on the program by
making the agency friendlier toward whistleblower claims. See Letter from Charles
E. Grassley, U.S. Senator, to John A. Koskinen, Nominee, Comm’r of Internal Rev-
enue (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/constituents/
upload/IRS-Nominee-Grassley-Letter-to-John-Koskinen-9-27-13.pdf.  In later writ-
ten testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Koskinen stated that “the IRS
benefits from the information and perspective generated by the . . . Whistleblower
office.” See Hearing to Consider the Nomination of John Andrew Koskinen to be Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (writ-
ten testimony of John A. Koskinen, Nominee, Comm’r of Internal Revenue),
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JAK_Opening_state-
ment_FINAL.PDF.
3. See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program
Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 471 (2010) (“The
2
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Section 6103 now prohibits the IRS from disclosing taxpayer information
“absent an explicit legislative exception.”4
But section 6103 actually is more porous than many taxpayers realize.
In 2012, the IRS acknowledged that it legally made more than 8 billion
disclosures of tax returns and return information to properly authorized
recipients under section 6103.5  The bulk of those disclosures were made
to states, congressional committees, and the Census Bureau.  Although the
Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation are required
to produce an annual public report detailing disclosures under the excep-
tions enumerated in section 6103, the statute does not require record-
keeping for releases under section 6103(n).6
With such a high number of authorized disclosures to various agen-
cies and quasi-governmental entities, one would assume that leaks of tax-
payer information would be relatively common.  Fortunately, it is rare for
taxpayers to be harmed by a violation of section 6103, but IRS vigilance is a
crucial component of the good safety record afforded taxpayer informa-
tion.7  Unknown is whether the same record could continue if
whistleblowers are afforded access to return information when it is possi-
ble that the unique motives underlying an informant’s submission may be
at odds with sound tax system administration.
1976 amendments marked a philosophical shift from treating tax information as a
‘generalized governmental asset’ that the executive branch was able to dole out at
will to a confidential, protected asset that only Congress could disseminate.”).
4. Id.
5. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6103(p)(3)(C) FOR CALENDAR YEAR
2012 (2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&
id=4514.
6. Section 6103(p)(3)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code states:
Public report on disclosures.  The Secretary shall, within 90 days after the
close of each calendar year, furnish to the Joint Committee on Taxation
for disclosure to the public a report with respect to the records or ac-
countings described in subparagraph (A) which—(i) provides with re-
spect to each Federal agency, each agency, body, or commission
described in subsection (d), (i)(3)(B)(i) or (7)(A)(ii) or (l)(6), and the
Government Accountability Office the number of—(I) requests for dis-
closure of returns and return information, (II) instances in which returns
and return information were disclosed pursuant to such requests or oth-
erwise, (III) taxpayers whose returns, or return information with respect
to whom, were disclosed pursuant to such requests, and (ii) describes the
general purposes for which such requests were made . . . .
I.R.C. § 6103(p)(3)(C) (2012).  Section 6103(p)(3)(A) provides that “the Secre-
tary shall not be required to maintain a record or accounting of requests for in-
spection or disclosure of returns and return information, or of returns and return
information inspected or disclosed, under the authority of subsections . . . (n).”
I.R.C. § 6103(p)(3)(A).
7. The most common occurrences of unauthorized section 6103 disclosures
happen from information technology-related security issues or inadvertent online
postings.
3
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS
Section 6103(n) already permitted the IRS to use services contracts
for disclosure of return information prior to the 2006 amendments to sec-
tion 7623,8 and the amendments did not specifically address whether Con-
gress intended for the revised whistleblower program to make use of
section 6103(n) agreements.  That space of silence has generated differing
opinions as to what role section 6103(n) should play in the IRS’s new
whistleblower framework.
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued proposed9 and
temporary10 regulations in 2008, under the authority of section 6103(n),
to allow disclosure to a whistleblower of some return information and
claim status information after a contract has been entered into.  Final reg-
ulations governing section 6103(n) contracts for whistleblowers were re-
leased in 2011, adopting the position in the 2008 regulations with only
minor grammatical changes.11
Under the general rule of the regulation, an IRS or Treasury em-
ployee is “authorized to disclose return information” to a whistleblower
and legal representative “to the extent necessary in connection with a writ-
ten contract” involving whistleblower claims.12  The regulation gives the
IRS discretion in deciding whether to enter into a section 6103(n) services
contract with an informant.13  In further language limiting when disclo-
sures in whistleblower cases can occur, Treasury stated that released infor-
mation “shall be made only to the extent the IRS deems it necessary in
connection with the reasonable or proper performance of the contract.”14
In some instances, only portions of the relevant taxpayer return informa-
tion need be provided under the contract.
As with any improper use of taxpayer return information, unautho-
rized inspection or disclosure of information obtained under a section
6103(n) contract is subject to strict civil and criminal penalties.15
8. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 6408, THE
“TAX RELIEF AND HEALTH CARE ACT OF 2006,” AS INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE ON
DECEMBER 7, 2006 88 (2006), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-50-06.pdf (noting
that present law “permits the IRS to disclose return information pursuant to a
contract for tax administration services”).
9. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2, 73 Fed. Reg. 15687, 15687–88 (Mar. 25,
2008).
10. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T (2008).
11. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2 (2011).  But one practitioner response
panned the proposed regulations as ultimately futile. See Jeremiah Coder, Proposed
Whistleblower Regs Detail Computations and Definitions, 137 TAX NOTES 1381 (2012)
(quoting whistleblower representative as stating that the regulations “provide[ ]
little comfort, for not one contract has ever been issued to a whistleblower pursu-
ant to” section 6103(n)).
12. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(a)(1) (2011).
13. See id. § 301.6103(n)-2(a)(2).
14. Id. § 301.6103(n)-2(b)(1).
15. See id. § 301.6103(n)-2(c) (citing I.R.C. §§ 7431, 7213, 7213A (2012)).
4
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Whistleblowers also must agree to a series of restrictions that the IRS labels
as “safeguards” under a section 6103(n) contract.  For example,
whistleblowers agree to comply with any and all requirements that the IRS
decides are necessary to protect the confidentiality of return information
provided under the agreements.16  Whistleblowers (and their representa-
tives) also must agree to allow the IRS to inspect their premises as part of
the access exchange.17
Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) Exhibit 25.2.2-10 provides a sample
confidentiality agreement under section 6103(n):
I, (name of whistleblower/representative), have received notice
from the IRS of the award recommendation in the case initiated
by my submission of a claim for award under 26 U.S.C. 7623
(state claim number).  I wish to participate in the administrative
proceeding leading to the determination of an award by the Di-
rector of the Whistleblower Office in this case, by reviewing addi-
tional information related to the award recommendation.  I
understand that information will not be disclosed to me unless
the disclosure is necessary as part of the administrative proceed-
ing, and unless I agree to maintain the confidentiality of any in-
formation on taxpayers other than myself (my client) disclosed
to me.  I agree that I will use any information disclosed to me
(my client) by the Whistleblower Office only for the purpose of
preparing comments on the recommendation to the Director, or
in appealing the Director’s determination by petitioning the US
Tax Court.  I understand that use of any information disclosed to
me (my client) for any other purpose may be considered a nega-
tive factor in determining the award payable under 26 U.S.C.
7623, and may result in a reduction of the award (but not less
than the minimum award required by law).  This agreement ap-
plies to any information disclosed as part of the administrative
proceeding leading to the determination by the Director of the
Whistleblower Office, including information contained in a Pre-
liminary Award Report or any other information made available
for my review by the IRS Whistleblower Office.  Any disclosures
made in connection with a request for review of the Director’s
determination by the US Tax Court, including re-disclosure of
information previously disclosed as part of the administrative
proceeding, will be governed by the rules of the Court.
Signed and witnessed[.]18
16. See id. § 301.6103(n)-2(d).
17. See id § 301.6103(n)-2(d)(3).
18. IRM Exhibit 25.2.2-10 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part
25/irm_25-002-002.html#d0e1036.
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One main reason for seeking a section 6103(n) contract for a
whistleblower is the possibility of getting some indication about how the
claim is progressing within the IRS.  The final regulations permit a
whistleblower to make a written request to the IRS, to which the IRS in
response “may inform the whistleblower . . . of the status of the
whistleblower’s claim for award . . . including whether the claim is being
evaluated for potential investigative action, or is pending due to an ongo-
ing examination, appeal, collection action, or litigation.”19  This avenue
can provide insight into the section 7623(b) case pipeline that may not be
available when contracts are not used.  Whether that justification warrants
relaxing the nondisclosure mandate is a central part of the debate sur-
rounding the tradeoffs inherent under section 6103(n).
III. HESITANCY FAVORED
The IRS has publicly proclaimed that written whistleblower contracts
could be a good thing in the right circumstances, but it has not yet en-
tered into a contract under section 6103(n).
The IRS updated the IRM following the 2006 amendments to section
7623 to set out procedures for handling high-dollar award claims.  As part
of its internal instructions to agents, the manual states that “it may be re-
quired and in the best interest of the Government to have a formal agree-
ment with the whistleblower when it is necessary to share information
obtained by the IRS from the taxpayer.”20  Although it characterizes the
use of the contracts as happening only in “rare circumstances,” the IRM
provision notes that section 6103(n) contracts with whistleblowers would
“include safeguards to protect the privacy of any taxpayer information
revealed.”21
The tone of the IRM provision has seemingly had the effect of dis-
couraging the use of section 6103(n) contracts in practice.  For example,
the IRM declares that such agreements “must be initiated by the Executive
responsible for the function seeking the contract, and approved by the
Business Operating Division not lower than the Deputy Commissioner
level.”22  That language has kept written whistleblower contracts from oc-
curring, in part because requiring high-level review to initiate a contract
makes it less likely that a subject matter expert or agent in an operating
division reviewing an award claim will take the time to pass the request up
the management chain.23  Proponents believe that the whistleblower pro-
19. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(b)(3) (2011).
20. IRM § 25.2.2.7.11 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/
irm_25-002-002.html#d0e589.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Jeremiah Coder, Treasury Finalizes Whistleblower Contract Regs, 130 TAX
NOTES 1399 (2011) (“Thus, the lack of contract use may be partially attributable to
the reluctance of the IRS operating divisions rather than the IRS Whistleblower
Office.”).
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gram would be better served if the IRS determined that the Whistleblower
Office, which has the most at stake in helping to change public perception
of the program, should have a role in getting section 6103(n) contracts
into existence, such as by championing contracts on an individual basis as
necessary in each case and working with the appropriate operating divi-
sion executive.
A 2011 letter24 to Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) from Steven T.
Miller, then IRS Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, pro-
vided further insight into the agency’s views on section 6103(n) contracts.
In the letter, Miller stated that the IRS took to heart the position articu-
lated by the Joint Committee on Taxation that such agreements would
“‘be infrequent and w[ould] be made only when the assigned task cannot
be properly or timely completed without the return information to be dis-
closed.’”25  Miller went on to clarify the IRS’s position that “[c]ontracts
relying on the authority of section 6103(n) are to be rare, based on a find-
ing of necessity to perform a tax administration function.”26  The IRS
would decline to enter into informant services contracts when it “can ob-
tain the required information or analysis using its own resources on a
timely basis,” he said.27  Yet later in the letter, Miller acknowledged that
“there are cases where it would be beneficial for us to contract with the
Whistleblower for technical assistance throughout the examination.”28
In a June 2012 memo,29 Miller pushed to make the whistleblower pro-
gram more effective by establishing tighter deadlines for specific actions
regarding informant claims.  In addition to establishing a “set of expecta-
tions for timely actions on whistleblower submissions”—such as initial
claim reviews within ninety days of receipt and award decisions provided
to whistleblowers within ninety days of a final determination of collected
proceeds—Miller tried to convey a new mindset with which whistleblowers
should be viewed by the IRS.30  Noting that whistleblowers have “insights
and information that can help the Service understand complex issues or
hidden relationships,” he called debriefing sessions with whistleblowers
24. Letter from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enforcement,
IRS, to Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Miller
Letter].
25. Id. (quoting “the Joint Committee on Taxation Report issued in conjunc-
tion with the 2006 amendments to section 7623”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.  The IRS has willingly utilized the assistance of whistleblowers in inves-
tigations following submission of an award claim.  For example, in Jarvis v. Commis-
sioner, the court noted that the whistleblower “work[ed] for the IRS in reviewing
and interpreting documents seized” from the taxpayer.  Jarvis v. Comm’r, 47 Fed.
Cl. 698, 705 (2000).
29. Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & En-
forcement, IRS, to Operating Div. Comm’rs, the Chief of Criminal Investigation,
and the Director of the Whistleblower Office, IRS Whistleblower Program (June
20, 2012), 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 121-15 [hereinafter Miller Memo].
30. Id.
7
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“an important component of the evaluation of whistleblower information”
and said that debriefings should “be the rule not the exception.”31
Miller also wrote that, “with appropriate controls, interaction with a
whistleblower during an examination can assist in timely and correct reso-
lution of issues.”32  A section 6103(n) written services contract, he contin-
ued, “may be used when disclosure of taxpayer information is necessary to
obtain a whistleblower’s insights and expertise into complex technical or
factual issues.”33
The permissive instruction of “may” in Miller’s memo was not as em-
phatic as some would have liked, but it offers the possibility that someday
the IRS might allow written contracts as a step in review of a whistleblower
award claim.
The memo received high praise from tax whistleblower practitioners,
many of whom hoped the directive would spur the IRS to follow the sug-
gested timelines and lead to a more accepting attitude toward informants.
Instead, the IRS has continued to eschew whistleblower contracts, which
has only increased the perception of many informants and their represent-
atives that the agency is treating them dismissively. For those wanting
change, the result of the IRS’s apparent philosophy of avoiding informa-
tion sharing with whistleblowers only leads to the unnecessary duplication
of efforts, wasted resources, and ultimately a slower IRS response to legiti-
mate tax avoidance claims.
IV. WORKING SMARTER
Whistleblower practitioners might argue that the IRS’s obstacles in
the section 6103(n) context stand in stark contrast to its general goals in
almost all other facets of tax administration of achieving efficiency and
instituting knowledge management practices.
The IRS has deployed several audit tools in recent years in an attempt
to be more efficient in its examinations of taxpayer returns.  For example,
under the IRS Large Business and International Division’s (LB&I) compli-
ance assurance process (CAP), which some practitioners and government
officials refer to as a “real-time audit,” the taxpayer and IRS exam team
continuously resolve outstanding tax issues so that the taxpayer obtains
certainty much sooner.  For the most part, previously contentious disputed
issues are resolved before a tax return is filed.  The process appeals to
many taxpayers and the government because it forgoes a retrospective
look at tax transactions wherein information is not as readily available and
provides more certainty regarding treatment in future years given an
exam’s outcome.  CAP has been made even more attractive with the addi-
tion of a maintenance phase for CAP taxpayers that the IRS deems low
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
8
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risk, which thereby narrows the number of issues that are under continu-
ous audit.
Another example of the IRS’s efforts to increase efficiency is the joint
LB&I-IRS Appeals initiative called Fast-Track Settlement, which began in
2001 and provides an alternative, accelerated dispute resolution proce-
dure for corporate taxpayers.  Although the procedure cannot be used
unless all parties—the taxpayer, the exam team, the issue management
team coordinator, and the fast-track coordinator—agree to participate,
the settlement process typically ends up with more efficient resolutions.
Also, there is the Schedule UTP, on which corporations are required
to self-report their uncertain tax positions.  Despite widespread corporate
criticism,34 the schedule was rolled out in 2010 as a way to clue auditors in
to possible areas of uncertainty that could represent tax noncompliance.35
The goal is to increase transparency, allowing the IRS to spend less time
identifying issues and helping the agency prioritize the selection of issues
and taxpayers for examination, while spotting significant areas of uncer-
tainty that require guidance.  The corporate reporting requirement affects
taxpayers or related parties that issue audited financial statements and
have both uncertain tax positions and assets greater than $10 million.36
The current filing requirements compel corporate taxpayers to submit a
list of UTPs ranked by actual size of the tax reserve amount, along with a
concise description of each position.  The IRS expanded its policy of re-
straint, promising to forgo seeking specific documents concerning a cor-
poration’s UTPs as well as the workpapers that document the completion
of Schedule UTP.
All three processes are examples of initiatives the IRS has established
specifically to enhance tax enforcement by streamlining the audit process
to use fewer government resources.  Given all the energy spent devising
and implementing these creative examination processes, critics of the cur-
rent administrative procedures complain that the IRS whistleblower pro-
gram is allowed to operate with many obstacles in place that thwart
Congress’s intended goal of flushing out unpaid taxes via timely and well-
placed information on high-dollar tax evasion.
The IRS itself has apparently noted that examinations resulting from
informant-provided information are more productive than traditional ex-
aminations arising from the use of the Discriminant Index Function
34. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-1 C.B. 408 (2010).
35. See Jeremiah Coder, Desire for Efficiency Drives UTP Proposal, Official Says,
127 TAX NOTES 760 (2010).
36. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-30 outlined a graduated adoption for compa-
nies, requiring only companies with assets greater than $100 million to report in
the first two years, after which companies with assets more than $50 million would
be required to file Schedule UTP. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-30, 2010-1 C.B.
668 (2010).  Companies with $10 million in assets are not required to file Schedule
UTP until tax years beginning in 2014. See id.
9
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(DIF).37  In an unreleased report from 1999, the IRS determined that
whistleblower-inspired audits have a highly desirable cost-benefit ratio,
with the agency incurring only four cents of costs per dollar collected.38
That figure contrasts with the ten cents of costs incurred per dollar col-
lected in DIF-selected exams.  In a more recent study, the Treasury Inspec-
tor General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) discovered in 2006 that the
adjustment dollars secured per hour spent on a whistleblower case for tax
returns from the 1996–1998 tax years yielded $946 per hour versus only
$548 per hour for DIF audits.39  In addition, the no-change rate40 was
significantly lower for audits involving whistleblower-provided information
(12%) than for normal examinations (17%).41  The same return analysis
held true for audits examined by TIGTA for fiscal years 2003–2005.42  The
2006 report concluded that “IRS data indicated that examinations initi-
ated based on informant information were often more effective and effi-
cient than returns initiated using the IRS’ primary method for selecting
returns for examination.”43
However, tax attorneys who represent corporations and high-net
worth individuals say that whistleblower claims are often based on vindic-
tive motives and misleading or incomplete information.44  Tax audits
driven by a whistleblower submission are sometimes merely a reflection of
an overlooked mistake or foot-fault that is corrected once the taxpayer is
made aware.45
37. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration describes the DIF
as “a mathematical technique used to classify income tax returns for examination
potential by assigning weights to certain basic return characteristics.” TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM NEEDS
MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 2 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter INFOR-
MANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf.
38. See IRS, THE INFORMANTS’ PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT LAW REWARD
PROGRAM (1999).
39. INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
40. An audit is classified as “no-change” when it is closed with no adjustments
or changes to the taxpayer’s reported tax liability.
41. INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
42. See id. at 5.  The adjustment dollars for whistleblower cases were $688 per
hour versus $382 per hour for DIF audits for fiscal years 2003–2005. Id.  The no-
change rate in that period was 21% for whistleblower exams and 28% for DIF
audits. Id.
43. Id. at 1–2.
44. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Whistle-Blowing: Many Cases, Few Results, 125 TAX
NOTES 186 (2009), available at http://www.tax-whistleblower.com/articles/Tax_
Whistle-Blowing_Many_Cases_Few_Results.pdf (quoting practitioner who stated
that whistleblower rules “do not adequately protect companies against disgruntled
employees,” creating “‘an incentive for even claims of dubious merit to be made’
. . . because there is no fraud requirement in the new framework”).
45. See id. (quoting same practitioner who stated that whistleblower program
fails to “weed[ ] out claims regarding errors that the taxpayer planned to disclose
anyway”).
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V. INFORMATION RELAY
The rub with whistleblower representatives is the belief that in the
absence of a written contract that allows a whistleblower to directly inter-
act with IRS employees when necessary, the resulting information gather-
ing processes can be inefficient and limiting for all parties involved.
Because of the strictures of section 6103, if an IRS auditor wants to obtain
more information in an exam based on a whistleblower claim, the agent
must first pass along a request to a taint review team, which gathers the
requested information from the whistleblower and relays it to the agent.46
The IRS processing of the Form 211 award claim can be long and
follow a winding path.47  When a claim initially appears to meet the sec-
tion 7623(b) threshold, a Whistleblower Office analyst will review the
claim for fraud potential and, if necessary, send the claim to the IRS Crim-
inal Investigation division.  If the claim has no fraud component, and the
analyst decides to further process the claim, it is sent to a subject matter
expert in the applicable operating division.48  The subject matter expert
conducts the taint review, identifies potential legal issues with the
whistleblower’s information, and often conducts a debriefing with the
whistleblower, before deciding whether to recommend pursuing the in-
formant’s lead.  If the lead is pursued, it is sent along for examination and
monitored until the exam is resolved.
Although the IRM envisions the use of debriefings—and those meet-
ings usually occur in practice—whistleblower practitioners do not view
debriefings as a sufficient substitute for entering into a section 6103(n)
contract.  IRM section 25.2.2.7.7 describes the debriefing as a meeting at
which the IRS can receive additional information from the informant, as-
sess the informant’s credibility, and learn about legal issues affecting the
use of documents supplied by the informant.  Although subsequent meet-
ings are contemplated to clarify a submission, the IRS generally believes it
can “proceed with an investigation or examination without further assis-
tance from the whistleblower.”49
46. One practitioner has called this process a “grown-up game of Operator.”
Coder, supra note 23.
47. See IRM 25.2.2.7 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_
25-002-002.html#d0e589.
48. If the analyst decides not to process the claim, a rejection recommenda-
tion is sent up the chain of command and ultimately a rejection letter is issued to
the informant. See IRM 25.2.2.7.4 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part25/irm_25-002-002.html#d0e589.
49. IRM 25.2.2.7.10 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/
irm_25-002-002.html#d0e589.  The IRM further states:
The law requires the Whistleblower Office to analyze 7623(b) claims, and
authorizes the Whistleblower Office to request assistance from the
whistleblower or their counsel.  In most cases, the IRS should be able to
receive information from a whistleblower, conduct a debriefing to ensure
the information provided is fully understood and that the IRS has all rele-
vant information the whistleblower can offer, and then proceed with an
investigation or examination without further assistance from the
11
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It is possible that the IRS might try to obtain some benefit from addi-
tional taxpayer information without the use of a section 6103(n) agree-
ment during the examination phase by expanding the scope of the award
determination administrative proceeding.  In its 2012 proposed regula-
tions,50 the Treasury said it was considering allowing whistleblowers to par-
ticipate in the award determination process before a final award
determination is made.  Under the proposed regulations, following issu-
ance of a preliminary award recommendation letter, the IRS
Whistleblower Office would engage the informant in a “structured process
involving correspondence and other communications” that allows the in-
formant to provide more information regarding the claim that is relevant
to the award determination.51
The IRS’s iteration of negative consequences from violating the terms
of a section 6103(n) agreement implicitly acknowledges that violations are
possible, even if expected to be rare.  The proposed regulations provide
that the IRS “may treat a claimant’s violation of the terms of the confiden-
tiality agreement as a negative factor and, thus, as a basis for reducing the
amount of an award.”52  An honest informant understands that failing to
abide by the terms of section 6103(n) is self-injurious to the informant’s
goal of the maximum award possible, but it is also naive to ignore the
likelihood that some whistleblowers, already motivated by either greed or
spite, might wantonly disclose confidential information in an attempt to
further punish a taxpayer.
VI. A FINELY BALANCED ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION
IRS officials and agency reports have highlighted the significant in-
crease in the number of whistleblower claims submitted as a result of Con-
gress’s enactment of a higher payout regime for some high-dollar claims.
Consequently, the IRS’s decision to avoid the use of any section 6103(n)
contracts has led whistleblower practitioners to call the regulations under
section 6103(n) practically useless.53
In the 2012 proposed regulations, the IRS acknowledged that it would
use confidentiality agreements in appropriate circumstances as “safe-
guards, to minimize possible redisclosures of return information while still
whistleblower.  In some cases, there may be a need to pose additional
questions to the whistleblower.  Such inquiries are governed by the ap-
propriate disclosure provisions contained in I.R.C. section 6103.  When
such an inquiry is made of a whistleblower, an exception to the require-
ment for reporting this type of third-party contact applies.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
50. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6103(h)(4)-1, 301.7623-1, 301.7623-2,
301.7623-3, 301.7623-4, 77 Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012).
51. 77 Fed. Reg. 74798, 74802 (Dec. 18, 2012).
52. Id. (discussing administrative proceedings for awards paid under section
7623(b)).
53. See Miller Letter, supra note 24 (confirming IRS has not entered into any
section 6103(n) contracts with whistleblowers in pending claims).
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providing meaningful opportunities for claimants to participate in
whistleblower administrative proceedings.”54  Those statements were not
assuring to whistleblower representatives, however, who do not believe
that the IRS intends to make section 6103(n) contracts a meaningful part
of the award claim process.
Instead, the whistleblower community strongly believes that the IRS
should adopt a more clearly defined position that makes mandatory the
use of whistleblower assistance.  One group of commentators who re-
sponded to the proposed regulations argued that “[m]andatory language
regarding a request for assistance will make clear to enforcement agents in
the field that whistleblowers are a valuable resource for ensuring payment
by tax scofflaws.”55  To that end, the commentators urged the IRS to
change the text of the proposed rules from “may” to “shall request the
assistance of an [informant] . . . in debriefing by meeting in person or by
telephone.”56  Another interest group took the IRS to task for being “si-
lent regarding the use of [section 6103(n)] agreements to promote full
utilization of whistleblower knowledge” in timely investigating and resolv-
ing whistleblower claims.57  The Service’s “reluctance to engage with
whistleblowers through 6103(n) agreements has impeded” more efficient
resolutions, the group claimed.58
Presumably, the frequent use of section 6103(n) agreements also
would reduce the likelihood of intentional disclosure of taxpayer informa-
tion during litigation.  The IRS has been worried that as part of the award
claim process, denial of a claim that raises the right for an informant to
challenge that decision in U.S. Tax Court59 would necessitate disclosure of
the Service’s grounds for an award determination, which could include
taxpayer information normally protected by section 6103.  While noting
that both the IRM and the 2012 proposed regulations provide for disclo-
sure under a confidentiality agreement, the IRS rightly acknowledges that
“[t]here appears to be no effective sanction, and no effective restraint,
when a whistleblower obtains confidential taxpayer information in discov-
ery and chooses to release that information to the public.”60
54. 77 Fed. Reg. 74798, 74804 (Dec. 18, 2012).
55. R. Scott Oswald, David Scher & Richard Peterson, EMP’T LAW GRP., Com-
ment on Proposed Rule for Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Under-
payments of Tax or Violations of Internal Revenue Laws 3 (Feb. 15, 2013), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2012-0051-0303.
56. Id.
57. Kristin Amerling, President & Exec. Dir., TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC.
FUND, Comment on Proposed Treasury Regulations 3 (Feb. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.taf.org/Comments-on-IRS%20December-2012-proposed-rule.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2012) (allowing whistleblowers to appeal an
award determination to U.S. Tax Court, which is given specific jurisdiction under
the statute).
60. IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION
7623 13–14 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/2012%20
IRS%20Annual%20Whistleblower%20Report%20to%20Congress_mvw.pdf.
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The IRS’s deep concern over disclosure to whistleblowers during the
discovery process should not be lightly dismissed.  The IRS, through its
Office of Chief Counsel, can seek appropriate mechanisms during the dis-
covery process that limit the extent to which taxpayer return information
could be mishandled.  For example, Tax Court rules 27 and 103 expressly
permit parties to seek protective orders and privacy protections for filings
made with the court.  The IRS could ask the court to limit viewing of tax-
payer information by a whistleblower to an in camera proceeding or re-
quest other limits appropriate to the situation to ensure that return
information is handled with the requisite care for privacy.
The Tax Court is grappling with what limits should be placed on dis-
covery during whistleblower award suits.  In a current whistleblower chal-
lenge to an award denial, the Tax Court has issued multiple orders,
including a protective order, that establish a careful process by which the
whistleblower is able to access a limited number of documents regarding
the underlying taxpayer.  The orders have required the IRS to redact the
taxpayer documents, place the documents under seal, and subject them to
an in camera review.  Moreover, the Tax Court has required the
whistleblower to submit a discovery request for specific taxpayer docu-
ments and granted the whistleblower access to only a small number of the
requested redacted documents.61  The orders clearly state that the pro-
duced information may be used for litigation purposes only, and that any
violation is subject “to sanctions and punishment in the nature of con-
tempt.”62  Although the limiting mechanisms in Tax Court to preserve the
confidentiality of taxpayer information are a first step, it is too early to tell
how whistleblowers not represented by competent counsel might handle
sensitive information despite the restrictions set in place by the court.  A
determined whistleblower could very well flout any court orders governing
confidentiality in order to cause public embarrassment to a company, even
at risk of contempt or other sanctions.
The extent to which company information will become a matter of
public knowledge has already occurred as the result of whistleblower litiga-
tion in the Tax Court.  For example, in Insinga v. Commissioner,63 the
whistleblower’s public pleadings identified a large company and financial
institutions as targets of his award claim, including extensive information
regarding the basis of his allegations.64  The expected increase in litiga-
tion arising from revised section 7623 also presages the fact that, despite
61. See Hill v. Comm’r, No. 25539-10W (T.C. July 24, 2013), available at http:/
/www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcDockInq/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexID=6069383.
62. Id.
63. No. 4609-12W (T.C. Mar. 13, 2013), available at https://www.ustaxcourt.
gov/InternetOrders/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexSearchableOrdersID=98885&
Todays=Y (ordering parties to schedule evidentiary hearing in response to respon-
dent’s motion to dismiss).
64. See Petition for Whistleblower Action Under Code Section 7623(b)(4), In-
singa v. Comm’r, No. 4609-12W (T.C. Dec. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 864738.
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noble efforts at protecting taxpayers from unwanted and spiteful expo-
sure, judicial review will inevitably bring more taxpayer information into
the public eye.  As explicitly recognized in a recent case, the Tax Court’s
general approach is that litigation within its domain is a matter of public
record.65
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the IRS has clear statutory and administrative authority to
enter into section 6103(n) whistleblower agreements, it has repeatedly
elected not to pursue those agreements in favor of maintaining a cautious
approach to information sharing.  While proponents argue that the end
result of that course of action is diminished capacity to fully investigate
viable whistleblower claims, and consequently, to enrich the fisc through
collection of high-dollar uncollected taxes, other tax practitioners believe
that the IRS is acting fairly to avoid potential serious damage resulting
from access to taxpayer information that ultimately cannot be appropri-
ately supervised.  Once out of the gate, there is no way to repair a tax-
payer’s image or credibility if a whistleblower bent on harm is granted
access to information within the taxpayer’s file.
Protection of taxpayer information is a good and necessary thing, and
something that has become an embedded expectation in tax system ad-
ministration; taxpayers have been harmed by unthinking or accidental IRS
dissemination of personal financial information.  The whistleblower pro-
gram can be a useful tool for the IRS to engage informants who have valid
claims against tax cheats.  But the program must also continue to offer
adequate protection of taxpayer information, sometimes even at the risk
of making the process more cumbersome, in order to maintain stable tax
system administration based on a strong foundation of taxpayer privacy.
65. See Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 183, 190 (2011).
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